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Functions of Procedure in Legal Education

An Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedure
inLegal Education
BV EDSON R. SUNDERLAND

Univermity of Michigan Law School

[Address delivered before "Round Table Conference" on Remedies at the
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools In Chicago, December 29, 1922.]

P

ROCEDURE
haslaw
always
the
bate
noire of the
schoolbeen
teacher.
No other subject. has developed such divergent opinions or such endless debates.
None recurs with such .periodic frequency and in no field of legal pedagogy has
discussion seemed so barren of results.

Three different general sessions of the
Association of American Law Schools
during the last ten years have been devoted largely or wholly to the subject
of teaching procedure, and yet no substantial progress seems to have been
made toward a standardized scheme of
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treatment.
Individual teachers and
schools have their individual views and
policies, and they go their own ways little affected by the views and policies of
others.
But the very insistence with which the
problem intrudes upon us suggests not
only that there is a widespread and instinctive appreciation of its importance,
but also that some solution is possible
if we only work at it hard enough. And
this brings u.p the question whether we
have ever adequately analyzed the functions which procedure should perform
in legal education. Unless we know
what goal we are working toward our
progress will be slow enough. But if
we can determine what definite purposes
are to be realized by teaching procedure,
we will be better able to assign to it its
true educational values and to place it
in proper relation to the rest of the
work of the law school. Perhaps we
have gone at the problem in the wrong
way. Until we know why it should be
taught we shall get nowhere in discussing how to teach it. The end to be
reached is the best and indeed the only
guide to an adequate method.
For this purpose, therefore, I purpose an examination into the reasons
why it is desirable that procedure be
given a place in a law school curriculum,
in the hope that such an inquiry may
pave the way for a more satisfactory
solution of the problems of pedagogical
method and emphasis.
II.
The most obvious purpose in teaching
procedure is to equip the student with
the technique which he will be called
upon to use in practice. The discussions
of the American Bar Association in its
section on Legal Education, and of the
Association of American Law Schools,
have centered about this phase of the
subject. Its value has been given different ratings, but has nowhere been whQlly
denied. The overwhelming opinion is
that instruction in procedure is advisable
as a preparation for practice within the
limits prescribed by two conditions, viz.
the development of feasible methods of

teaching it and the capacity of a crowded curriculum to hold it against the pressure of other subjects.
As to methods of teaching it is clear
that no difficulty occurs with pleading.
The case system has absorbed the subject with perfect ease. The principles
of trial practice are equally well adapted
to the case method. Two casebooks devoted to this subject are in use in American law schools, and after ten years of
experience with one of them, and almost
as many with the other, it can be stated
as a demonstrated fact that trial practice
can be taught as easily and successfully
with case material as any subject in the
law school course.
Appellate practice has not yet been
taken up as a law school title, largely, I
think, because of the lack of a casebook.
But the subject is ideally fitted to the
case method of development. Its fundamental problems are quite free from the
restrictions of a statutory body of law.
The various methods of appellate review,
such as writ of error, appeal, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and certificates,
are well defined remedies and proceed
upon definite theories which are almost
everywhere operative. The question,
What is appealable? is one which carries
the student into broad questions of appellate policy and develops an accurate
sense of the real nature and purpose of
appellate review. Only incidentally do
the cases turn on local statutes, -and even
here there is a remarkable similarity in
American statutory enactments and a
constant recourse to fundamental principles exhibited in their application. The
proper parties to an appellate' proceeding
may be as profitably investigated as parties to actions at law or in equity. The
manner and purpose of laying a foundation in the lower court for an appeal,
the requisites and the effect of a transfer of the cause, the purpose of a supersedeas and the scope of its operation,
the assignment of errors or grounds of
appeal and the requisites and preparation of an adequate record on appeal,
the scope of the 'review, and the whole
doctrine of harmless or prejudicial error, the effect of affirmance, modifica-
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tion, and reversal, and the character of
the proceedings in the lower court after
remand-all these matters are full of
vital interest to the prospective practitioner and are capable of admirable casebook treatment. They develop fundamental conceptions of judicial administration, and only through a scientific
study of appellate theory can one intelligently prepare and effectively carry
out proceedings for the review of a
cause.
Further development of procedural
study, beyond pleading and trial and appellate practice, is doubtless entirely
feasible from a teaching standpoint.
The nature of judgments and decrees,
direct and collateral attack upon them,
and their force and effect in bar or estoppel, are extremely important subjects.
And it is probable that a study of methods for enforcing judgments and decrees, by execution, attachment, garnishment, and contempt, would prove to be
a valuable extension of the field of law
school work. All of these additional
branches of procedure involve the same
pedagogical problems as those which
have already been introduced into the
school curricula. Material on the study
of appellate procedure has been so far
worked out that within a year one law
school at least will probably be teaching
the subject by means of cases. From
the side of methodology the theoretical
objections have been wholly disproved,
and the practical obstacle due to lack of
available casebooks is quite likely to disappear in the not distant future.
To what extent the practice court
should be resorted to will perhaps con-'
tinue to be a mooted question. But it is
a minor problem. As between casebooks
and cases in the practice court, the individual preferences and characteristics
of teachers will have much to do. Probably both should be used. The monotonous nature of continuous casebook study
is tending to make students go stale in
the latter part of their course, and the
practice court furnishes a most welcome
and refreshing change, irrespective of its
intvinsic effectiveness as a method.
The other condition already mentioned,

viz. the capacity of a crowded curriculum to admit work in procedure in the
face of the immense pressure of substantive courses, is more complex. But it is
clear that there is room for all courses
which are deemed sufficiently important, so that the question is really one of
relative value. Value depends largely
on function, so that this phase of the
problem fundamentally involves the
whole subject of the present paper.
The value of procedure as direct equipment for practice cannot be sharply separated from its value for the other purposes which will be presently discussed,
but certain suggestions may be derived
from available data. It would seem fair
to assume that the general value of a
subject as direct preparation for practice would be roughly proportional to
the volume of actual litigation upon that
subject. Such volume may be measured
by the amount of space devoted to it in
the general digests. This method of computation shows the following interesting.
facts :
Three procedural subjects which are
given practically no attention in most
American law schools, viz. trials, appeal
and error, and judgments, demand in
the aggregate more than twice as much
attention from courts and lawyers as the
five typical substantive subjects of bills
and notes, contracts, corporations, sales,
and trusts, to which American law
schools commonly devote about onequarter of the hours required for the law
degree. If the same proportion holds
for other substantive subjects, these all
but neglected procedural subjects develop about half as much actual difficulty
in -practice as the whole body of substantive law studied by any given student in his entire law school course. If
a certain class of diseases made up halfthe suffering of the human race, no reputable medical school would attempt to
justify a system of medical education
which practically ignored them all.
And another significant fact may be
drawn from a study of the digests, and
that is, that the vast amount of litigation over questions of procedure is not
showing any sign of abatement. In the

The American Law School Review
discussion of the subject of teaching those who are charged with the duty of
trial practice which occurred at the meet- preparing students to enter into the pracing of the Association of American Law tice of the law in an unutopian world.
Schools in Montreal in 1913, one of the An admission by the law schools of their
speakers suggested that the real reason inability to substantially increase their
why that subject had never found an contribution toward making procedural
undisputed place in the law school course machinery function more efficiently,
was that it was an ephemeral subject, would be a confession of educational
which had had its day and was about bankruptcy.
to pass out of existence. He said:
ItI.
"Trial practice; in the sense that we
A second purpose to be served by
have had explained to us to-night, was
developed in the United States after teaching procedure arises from the fact
1850. It reached its zenith about 1875, that procedural reform, which is always
it began its decline about 1900, and I un- needed but never so badly as at the presdertake- to say it will be steadily of less ent time in the United States, is almost
importance in the development of our wholly dependent upon a bar educated
to want it and to know how it can be
law in the future."
Now the data from the digests show obtained. Legislatures cannot deal with
no such historical development, but rath- the technique of procedure, except
er a steadily rising practical importance. through the small group of lawyer memAs compared with the five substantive bers, who usually constitute the judiciary
subjects above named (bills and notes, committees. And outside pressure for
contracts, corporations, sales, and trusts) such legislation, which is an almost indistrial practice showed 28 per cent. as pensable prerequisite for the passage of
much litigation in the period from the any act, for general betterment, must
beginning down to 1896, 40 per cent. as come, if at all, from the lawyers pracmuch from 1897 to 1906, and 77 per ticing in the.jurisdiction. Now, lawyers
cent. as much from 1907 to 1921. In as a class tend not only to be uninterestother words, the relative amount of liti- ed in new methods for administering
gation on trial practice during the last jrustice, but they are more than likely
fourteen years has almost doubled as to actively oppose them on general princompared with what it was in the pre- ciples of policy. Why repeal the techvious ten years. The same data disclose nrique which they have acquired at so
similar results as to the three procedural great a cost, and force themselves to
subjects mentioned (trials, appeal and learn a new one? The lawyer feels a
error, and judgments). In the period vested interest in the rules of procedure
prior to 1896 these three procedural sub- which he has learned to use. He is a
jects furnished 110 per cent. as much thorough-going conservative in this field
litigation as the five substantive sub- by instinct and training.
This is entirely natural in view of the
jects already named, from 1897 to 1906
they furnished 143 per cent. as much, monopolistic character of judicial adand during the last fourteen years, from ministration. If doctors of medicine
1907 to 1921, they furnished 234 per practiced under a system which necescent. as much litigation.' Such figures, sarily enforced absolute conformity to
while perhaps to be taken as approxima- established technique upon every member
tions merely, can hardly be ignored by of the profession, we should soon see a
slowing down of improvement in medi1 Figures are based upon the material appearcal practice. It is competition in mething under the respective heads in the Century
ods which gives the stimulus for the deDigest, Decennial Digest, and those average
annual volumes of the American Digest appear- velopment of new ones. No such coming in 1907, 1914, and 1921, except that the
material on trials and appeal and error, illog- petition exists in the procedural field of
ically digested under Criminal Law, has been
the law. All lawyers must use the same
shifted to those subjects, where it properly berules. The only opportunity for competilongs.
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tion is in the use of the old rules, not
in the discovery and employment of new
rules. Professional ingenuity, therefore,
is driven to realize itself through clever
refinement in manipulation of the technical system currently in force. This
develops a barren formalism, which kills
the spirit of progress. A small minority,
with a vision transcending the rules
around which their professional lives
are forced to revolve, feel that legal procedure is out of touch with the changing
social order; but they are for the most
part onl- voices crying in the wilderness.
Furthermore, American lawyers are
a hard-working body of men, crowded
with a thousand duties and responsibilities, with little leisure or nervous energy, even if they felt the inclination,
for keeping in touch even with those improvements in judicial administration
which have been so systematically developed in British dominions, or which
have sporadically sprung up in various
parts of the United States. Only a small
minority take or read the law magazines.
A somewhat larger minority attend Bar
Association meetings, state or national,
and pick up a few suggestions as to improvements in administrative methods.
But when we consider that it is the most
enterprising and progressive members of
the bar which usually attend such meetings, and then observe how few even of
that select group take any active interest
in procedural reform, and how many
deprecate any substantial departure from
the established rules, the wonder is that
the system ever improves at all.
It is quite apparent that the professional duties of American lawyers cover
the two different functions of making the
procedural law and using it in practice.
If the law schools are to educate for the
profession of the law, they must definitely recognize both these functions; and
as between the two their duty to educate
the on-coining generations of lawyers in
the field of procedural reform is the
more pressing, for a lawyer can be at
least partially educated in practice at the
expense of his clients and the public,
after he gets into his professional work,

but there is not one chance in a hundred
that he will ever develop a real interest
or a sound understanding concerning the
specific needs and the practical possibilities of procedural reform if left to his
own devices. The sorely tried public is
quite discouraged over the present methods of judicial administration. They
blame the bench and bar. Much of that
blame belongs to the law schools. If the
schools should seriously take up this
great work of laying a foundation for
radically improved legal methods, treat-,
ing it as a duty and privilege second in
importance to no other branch of legal
education, they would win both the gratitude and confidence of the public.
The law schools are fully equipped to
do this work. Their libraries contain the
material necessary for it, and their present curricula can absorb it without substantial readjustment. It should not be
conducted as a special seminary course
for a few advanced students, but should
be brought to the attention of every student who goes through the school. The
courses for teaching procedure as currently used in the courts should be employed at the same time for the broader
purpose of exhibiting possibilities of improvement. Every procedural doctrine
should be subjected to constructive criticism in regular course of instruction.
The value of every rule should be tested
by its tendency to produce desirable or
undesirable results. The causes for dissatisfaction with the operation of rules
should be constantly sought, and fundamental misconceptions ruthlessly exposed. No rule should be accepted at its
face value merely because it bears the
seal of conventional approval. Indeed,
procedure should be taught as a mere
mechanism designed to reach certain results. It is valuable solely as a means
to an end. No rule of procedure should
be considered as having any inherent
merit whatever. Every one should be
studied with reference to two questions:
(1) What administrative purpose is it designed to serve? (2) How far does it
succeed and how far does it fail in that
purpose? Such a study will bring up a
third question in each instance, namely:

The American Law School Review
What changes in the old rule or what
new rule in its place will produce the
maximum of advantage while carrying
the minimum of inconvenience? In this
way procedure will not only be presented
to the student as the concrete form under which jurisprudence now realizes
itself in acton, but the basic nature of
the demands made by the law for a
workable system of self-expression will
be revealed., Fundamental procedural
principles will formulate themselves,
through such a study, and the resources
and possibilities of judicial methods and
court organization, available for the
service of society, will be exhibited. The
study of procedure, based on the familiar case material, will therefore be both
anatomical and physiological, developing
both the structure of the currently employed system and its functional limitations, thus forming a solid basis for
building up a rational and practical theory of legal prophylaxis and therapeutics.
Lawyers become so accustomed to the
forms which they employ that they look
upon change as heresy. Principles of
law and rules of procedure, being equally operative in the course of the administration of justice, tend to fade into
one another and to assume an identical
sanctity. Respect for law becomes deference for method, and this produces
stagnation in judicial administration.
The deadening result can be defeated by
the active efforts of *the law schools.
They must make their students procedural iconoclasts, having no final respect for a'iy rule of practice which is
unable to prove its value as a convenient
means to a legitimate end.
The strategic strength of the law
school posilion in this field is perfectly
well known to all who have given it any
thought. And the resultant duty is
clear. As Chief Justice Winslow, of
Wisconsin, said to the American Bar Association in 1912, in an address on the
Relation of Legal Education to Simplicity in Procedure: "If we are to have
simplified procedure which shall accomplish the desired results, we must first
have a scientifically educated, as well as

a high-minded, bench and bar to administer that procedure. Inasmuch as
legal education is now obtained almost
exclusively from the law schools, the
question how we are to obtain such a
bench and bar seems in popular parlance
to be 'up to the law schools.'

*

*

*

Every law school should give its students a course in scientific simplified
procedure, or 'ideal procedure,' if you
choose."

2

If the law schools seriously take up
this problem they will accomplish farreaching results in removing one of the
chief causes of dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice by the courts.

IV.
Beyond the two purposes already considered there is another which is more
important than either, although less obvious. It relates to a problem lying at
the very foundation of the administration of justice, namely, professional
ethics. This has always been a critical
point of contact between the laity and
the 'bar. As far back as our literature
runs we find that the people have been
keenly dissatisfied with the moral attitude of the legal profession. They are
as suspicious of the lawyer's motives as
they are critical of his methods, and
often feel that technique is only a cloak
for iniquity.
Even so kindly a soul as the Quaker,
Jonathan Dymond, writing a book upon
the Principles of Morality, found it necessary to-devote a chapter to the Morality of Legal Practice, and in explanation,
said: "If it should be asked why, in a
book of general morality, the writer selects for observation the practice of a
particular profession, the answer is simply this: That the practice of this particular profession peculiarly needs it. It
peculiarly needs to be brought into juxtaposition with sound principles of morality." 3

Now there are lawyers-too many of
them-who do not possess the moral
character necessary to perform the exacting duties and resist the great tempta2 Proc. Am. Bar. Ass'n, 1912, p. 743.
8

Essay II, c. V.
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tions of legal practice. Moral qualifications for admigsion to the bar are paramount, and the rising tide of opinion
that higher educational requirements are
necessary is to a very large extent due
to the feeling that only the morally
sound will have sufficient strength of
character to undergo so severe a training. Disbarments prove the presence of
the morally unfit, and doubtless such
proceedings are far too seldom brought.
But I do not believe it can be proved
that the standard of morals among men
who practice law is lower than among
men in other professions or in business
or politics. It probably is higher, as it
ought to be. Nevertheless I think it is
quite evident that the public is convinced
that there is something about the professional actions of lawyers which is peculiarly unsatisfactory to the moral sense.
So -prevalent a belief, arising from a long
and intimate experience, may be assunied
to rest upon substantial evidence. Is
there, then, something about the law itself which draws men who practice it
away from the kind of conduct which
the public considers moral? I believe
there is, and that the training given to
lawyers and the habits of mind produced
by that training are primarily responsible for the apparent lack of moral quality
shown in the administration of the law.
The corrective lies in an adequate appreciation of the true function of procedure, as I shall try to show.
Now the law consists of two distinct
and almost independent sets of rules or
principles; one making up the field of
so-called substantive law, the other the
field of procedure. The first group is
primary, and constitutes an essential part
of the structure of society; the second
is secondary and derivative, and merely
serves to make the first operative. The
first group is relatively fixed, and only
changes with the slow evolution of social relations; the second is relatively
flexible, having no universal quality, but
being the mere manifestations of opportunist ingenuity. To radically revise the
first would mean a social revolution, but
the second could be totally reorganized
at a moment's notice, without causing a

tremor in the social structure.

While

the safety and security of civilization
may be said to require stability in the
first group, safety and security can be
realized only by elasticity in the second.
The distinction here made is not absolute but only relative. The principles
determining rights and liabilities, while
immediately fixed, are ultimately subject
to change as social conditions make new
principles necessary. Law is undoubtedly a means to an end, and no stage in
its development can be called final. Nevertheless this distinction between the substance of law and the form of its operative activity is valid. If we say that
real property has a necessarily fixed location, while personal property does not,
we speak inaccurately, for no piece of
land occupies the same position in space
for two consecutive moments. And yet
for terrestrial purposes the distinction is
sound. So, as a practical matter in dealing with law, we may truly say that the
principles of substantive law, as compared with procedure, are fixed and constant, and that the preservation of the
status quo is the highest duty of the
legal profession; and we may say with
equal truth that the rules of procedure,
as compared with the substantive law,
are variable and in need of perpetual
revision, and that the legal profession
owes no duty to preserve them, but only
to make them useful agencies in the service of society.
The lawyer must therefore develop
different attitudes toward the law of
rights and duties and the law procedure.
As an officer engaged in the administration of the law, he must apply the first
with universal impartiality," treating it
as the established and true basis of society, and must regard its enforcement
as a socially necessary end in itself.
Procedure, on the other hand, he must
consider as a mere means whereby such
enforcement can be effected in the most
efficient and beneficent way. He must
recognize the vital difference between, the
rules by which society adjusts its relations and the rules* by which judicial
machinery operates. In the procedural
field the lawyer is concerned with a mech-
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anism in which society has no interest, except in its tendency to produce
results in harmony with social values.
In the substantive field he is concerned
with the ultimate merits of controversies
as determined by the fundamental law,
and this involves an exact knowledge of
that law and a precise application of its
principles to the cases which arise. In
this field the lawyer has a definite task,
in which society has given him no freedom of action. Generally speaking, it
is not for him to pass upon the wisdom
or moral quality of the law. That is a
legislative matter. In case of doubt as
to what the law is on a given subject,
he may, of course, urge moral advantages in one rather than another view;
but this is a comparatively rare occurrence. In the great bulk of his professional work he is -concerned with the
purely intellectual task of discovering
what the law is, and the equally intellectual task of applying that law accurately, and impartially, coldly, to the facts
before him. A case either does or does
not* fall within a certain rule of law.
To determine this question he employs
all the skill of a trained logician. He
marshals analogies; he points out distinctions; he analyzes groups of facts
and exhibits their logical relations; he
refutes alternations by reducing them
to absurdities; he builds up series of
syllogistic equations. But in all this he
passes no ethical judgments. He is concerned not at all with the moral values
of the acts involved, but solely with
their legal values, and legal values of
facts are as far removed from morality
as are the mathematical values of spaces
and numbers; or the chemical values of
mineral elements, or the physical values
of ether waves. Like the scientist he is
not acting immorally, but non-morallyoutside the moral field.
In the field of procedure, on the contrary, the lawyer is constantly concerned with ethical problems, for that field
is the field of professional conduct.
Here the question is not what is the law,
but what shall I do. Shall I use a capias
and arrest the defendant, or a summons
and merely give him notice? Shall I

annoy my opponent with an attachment?
Shall I drag him away from home into a
foreign court? Shall I hide my real defense under a general demurrer or a general issue? Shall I ask for a continuance, move for a directed verdict, request certain instructions to the jury,
move for a new trial, assign certain errors? All these questions are to be answered by giving moral values to the
alternatives of conduct. There are conflicting interests, as in every moral problem. The lawyer must consider his client, but need not wholly forget himself;
he must remember that his opponent has
a right to fair treatment, and that society
has a large stake in the successful operation of its judicial agencies. Which
elements shall, in the particular case before him, have controlling force? On
what basis shall he compromise the inconsistent tendencies?
It is quite clear that he cannot justify
his conduct by showing that he did nothing positively forbidden under the doctrines of procedure in force, for the
rules of procedure have no independent
value, but must be deemed good or bad
solely in relation to the ends to be reached by them. An automobile has no moral value, but may become an agency for
good conduct, as when it carries a physician to a patient's bedside, or for bad
conduct, as when it aids a criminal to
escape. And the driver, when charged
with immoral practice, could hardly defend on the ground that he did nothing
contrary to the mechanical rules for the
operation of automotive vehicles. So a
lawyer in prosecuting a case must answer for his conduct, not by showing
that every proceeding which he employed
was a well-recognized and legitimate mechanical process for conducting litigation, but he must go further and demonstrate that he employed them for morally
justifiable purposes. A distinction must
be drawn between the use and the abuse
of legal procedure, and this distinction
is strictly moral. Every step taken presents the legal problem of utility and fitness, and the ethical problem of rightness or goodness.
There can be no doubt of the moral
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content in procedural acts, for they all
entail consequences affecting others.
Thus Dewey says: "The moral quality
of any impulse or active tendency can
be told only by observing the sort of consequences to which it leads in active

essarily empirical, can do no more than
aid in making compromises that are the
least objectionable. To arrive. at the best
compromise in any case, implies correct
conceptions of the alternative results of
this or that course. And, consequently,
practice."' And again he says: "Con- in so far as the absolute ethics of insideration of consequences of the act in dividual conduct can be made definite,
the way of effect upon the happiness it must help us to decide between conand misery of all concerned, furnishes flicting personal requirements and also
the only proper way of regulating the between the needs for asserting self and
formation of right ends." ' And still the needs for subordinating self." 7
again: "A moral principle, then, is not
Now, the widespread criticism of the
a command to act or forbear acting in a administration of justice relates to the
given way; it is a tool for analyzing a use which is made of the rules of prospecial situation, the right or wrong be- cedure. Complaint is made of delay, uning determined by the situation in its en- certainty, and the excessive emphasis
upon technical points. Summarized, this
tirety, and not by the rule as such." 6
Every problem connected with pro- only means that the profession is using
cedure presents a dilemma of conflicting the rules of procedure, most of which
interests with several possibilities of are proper enough in themselves, for imchoice. No two procedural situations proper purposes. In other words, laware identically the same, so that fixed yers professionally fail as actors in a
rules for determining conduct cannot be moral world.
The reason is not far to seek. Lawrigidly applied.
The principle upon
which choice of action must be based is yers are concerned with two different
necessarily a moral principle, for legal fields, one purely legal, one partially ethrules only present the opportunity of ical, and their training is so largely legal
choice, but do not solve its problem. If that they allow legal methods and legal
we accept the prevailing theory of utili- standards to exercise a dominant control,
tarian ethics, which seems peculiarly ap- to the exclusion of moral elements. The
propriate in judging the conduct of a constant aim of the lawyer is to bring
public profession, we shall find the true the particular case under some estabmotive of choice to be the greatest aggre- lished and binding general rule. He
gate good to the lawyer, his client, the seeks resolute resplts, not approximaopposing lawyer, and his client, the tions or compromises. There is an arbijudge, the jury, the witnesses, and the trary finality about his judgments. One
general public. A conscientious consid- ground for recovery is precisely as good
eration of the rights of all these parties as forty grounds; one defense is exactly
to the litigation will result in a true eth- equal to another. The defendant is eithical judgment. Such a judgment will al- er liable or not liable. There are no inways be a compromise, but this merely termediate gradations. We have either
demonstrates its moral rather than its a valid execution of an instrument or no
legal nature. As Spencer says in his execution at all. The consideration for
a contract is either good or bad-100 per
Principles of Ethics:
cent. or 0. The slightest trace of con"Life hourly * * * brings inditributory
negligence is as utterly destrucvidual interests face to face with the intive
of
the
plaintiff's right as the most
terests of other individuals, taken singly
or as associated. In many such cases wanton recklessness. A life of rectitude
the decisions can be nothing but com-. weighs nothing against a single false
promises; and ethical science, here nec- step. There is a ruthlessness in the operation of these rules of the law which
'Ethics, by Dewey and Tufts, p. 250.
refuses to take into account individual
5Id. p. 266.
a Id. p. 334.

7 Page 284.
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Hard cases
needs or circumstances.
make bad law. Justice is a blindfolded
goddess.
Habits of thought acquired by the rigid discipline of the substantive law inevitably follow the lawyer into the field
of procedure. Accustomed to form legal
judgments as a pure exercise of his logical powers, he naturally pursues the same
course in dealing with procedural rules.
Unrestricted by moral considerations in
the major problems of liability he finds
himself equally unconcerned with them
in the minor problems of procedure. He
develops a thoroughly consistent and
uniform attitude toward all classes of
legal ,questions, which is essentially nonmoral. It ignores ethical principles as
irrelevant and immaterial.
Writers on ethics have noted this characteristic of the legal profession. Dewey says that "the 'legally minded' man is
likely to be one with whom technical
precedents and rules are more important
than the good to be achieved and the

evils to be avoided," s for the legal view
of conduct tends to magnify the letter
of morality at the expense of its spirit.9

Knowlson, writing on Originality, asserts that the last person who ought to be
allowed to exercise control over governmental agencies is the lawyer, because
"the legal mind has too strong a tendency toward guidance by precedent,"
that is, by formal logic, and is accustomed to a form of mental procedure which
is ethically injurious.1"
The system of legal education which
we use is admirably adapted to perpetuate this legal-stic attitude. We train for
logical accuracy rather than for public
service. The spirit of our teaching was
well expressed by James Barr Ames
when he said that the chief purpose of
the Harvard Law School was to develop
"the power of legal reasoning." " Most
teachers can properly make the same assertion in regard to their own schools.
In all the substantive branches of the
law we aim to be sure, to give the requi8 Dewey

and Tufts, Ethics, p. 466.
9 Id. p. 327.

1e Page 213.
11 Proceedings Ass'n Am. Law Schools, 1907,
p. 16.

site historical and social perspective, and
to impart an adequate amount of technical information, but our great task is
to train the mind in legal thinking. Perhaps 80 or 90 per cent. of our effort is
directed toward this end. Power in
solving legal problems is the final goal
of the law school course. If we can
graduate men with well trained legal
minds, we feel that our work has been
well done.12
By our very emphasis upon the purely intellectuaf content of the law we hide
the ethical quality of its administration.
The logic which solves its problems of
liability is assumed to be sufficient to
guide the choice of its procedural means.
After three years of intensive effort in
testing human actions solely by the
rigid rules of law, weighing it in a moral
vacuum, and judging it by the cold processes of pure reason, how can the student be expected to test his own professional conduct by any other standard?
He has developed a non-moral habit
of thought in dealing with juridical data,
and that habit follows him in his professional work throughout his career. To
use the language of a careful and philo"Every lawyer
sophical observer:
: * * has his legal mind formed in its
impressionable period by the traditional
mode of thinking upon legal and juristic questions. All questions are looked
at from the standpoint of this received
juristic tradition." 13 The effect of legalism upon the ethical instincts is the
same as the effect of asceticism upon the
-ocial instincts. They cease to function
with normal vigor.
If a concrete demonstration of this inveterate mental habit should be sought,
12 This is often and emphatically stated as
For exa commonplace of legal pedagogy.
ample, the following: "The only help for our
lawyer lies in his capacity to reason accurately
and convincingly from fixed precedents. tHence
there slowly arose a recognition of the fact that
that law school did most for its students which
taught them to think clearly and accurately
in terms of settled legal principles, to analyze,
test and weigh precedents under the fierce light
of reason, and trained them in the art of applying old principles to new states of fact."Vance, "The Ultimate Function of the Teacher
of Law," Pro. Ass'n Am. Law Schools, 1911,
p. 33.
"Taught Law," Pro. Ass'n Am.
3 Pound:
Law Schools, 1912, p. 60.

Functions of Procedure in Legal Education
the practice in regard to reversals for
misconduct of counsel will furnish it.
Hundreds of cases may be found in the
reports where, by tricks of sharp practice, lawyers have knowingly asked improper questions in order to bring inadmissible evidence to the attention of the
jury, have made direct appeal to the
jury's prejudices and passions, have
browbeaten and insulted witnesses, have
tampered with members of the panel,
have employed false testimony, or have
argued beyond the scope of the evidence.
Here there is a clear double aspect of
the case. The conduct is contrary to
legal rules; it is also directly immoral.
But in the vast majority of such cases
the court limits its action to the former
aspect and completely neglects the latter. Legal error looms so large, and
morhl delinquency, when put in competition with it, seems so small, to the legalistic mind, that reversal for error is the
sole remedy employed. Why merely
penalize the innocent client, and let the
guilty lawyer go unpunished? There is
no lack of power in the court. There is
only the lack of moral judgment.
Equally striking is the attitude of
many judges in disbarment cases. A
lawyer commits deliberate perjury in the
court in which he practices. It is proved
beyond doubt. A layman, for the same
offense, would receive a penitentiary sentence; the lawyer is merely suspended
14
from practice for two or three years.
Another lawyer hires two adventurers
to falsely impersonate his clients in effecting a settlement for a large damage
claim, himself signs their forged release
as a witness and takes the money. For
this combined false pretense and forgery he is merely suspended from practice for a couple of years. 15 The judges
in these cases are high-minded men but
their legalistic habit of mind, has atrophied their sense of moral values in the
field of legal practice.
When Justice John H. Clarke recently commented on the astonishing discussions and distinctions in the field of con14 Matter of Andrew J. Sawyer, 1 Mich.
State Bar Jour. XXVI.
15 Matter of Calvin L. Bancroft, 2 Mich.
State Bar Jour. *49.

stitutional law which the Supreme Court
of the United States was forced to listen
to, and observed that ingenuity and refinement were rapidly converting the
members of the legal profession in this
country into a group of casuists rivaling
the Middle Ages schoolmen in subtlety
of distinction and futility of argument, 1"
he was only observing the natural effect
of our overemphasis of the abstract and
logical qualities of the law. The antidote for legal casuistry is a well-developed and ethical conscience in the lawyer's
daily professional work.
Legal ethics cannot be effectively
taught by lectures or by reading canons
of ethics. Most ethical rules which can
be formulated are necessarily vague and
general, and like all abstractions mean
little to the student. What is wanted is
a proper habit of mind, not mere information as to conventional standards of
legal respectability. The student must
accustom himself to an instinctive recourse to moral rather than exclusively
legal tests in passing upon procedural
problems. 'He must feel the position of
the lawyer as an officer of the court in a
thoroughly fundamental and practical
sense. He must consider rules of procedure as the forms through which justice is to be realized. The right to practice law is the right to employ procedural
processes, and that right is a trust conferred upon the members of the bar for
the benefit of society. Every hour in the
classroom in procedure should be an
hour devoted to a study of the justification of the uses to which procedure may
be put.
It is not enough to know what demurrers are designed to do; the deeper
question is, what should a lawyer do
with demurrers? A case turns upon a
special demurrer. Two points are involved: Was the pleading subject to
such a demurrer? Was the good to be
accomplished by its use sufficient under
the circumstances to counterbalance the
time, effort, and expense consumed by
the parties, the counsel, and the court?
A general demurrer is involved. Techof
no specification
nique requires
16 Am. Bar Ass'n Journal, May, 1922, p. 263.
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grounds; but what can be said of a system which allows a demurrant to lie in
wait for his opponent, give him no notice
of the point of attack, and overwhelm
him with surprise and confusion? A
score of requisites for drawing pleadings
are taken up one by one. What purpose
does each one serve? Is the rule well
adapted to reach that purpose? In each
case studied is the rule usefully invoked,
or has technical zeal or professional callousness made it only a means of annoyance and 9ppression?
We study the requisites of a writ. Is
it a nullity without a seal? The Supreme Court of Georgia, looking at a
writ as only a substantial agency for due
process of law, can hardly treat the question seriously." The Supreme Court of
Montana, following the United States
Supreme Court like a Rip Van Winkle,
waking after three centuries of sleep,
solemnly declares that a writ without a
seal is exactly equivalent to a blank sheet
of paper, even on a collateral attack, notwithstanding a statute commanding the
court to disregard every error or defect
in the proceedings not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.' 8 What
better material could be found for contrasting the ethical and social standards
for administering justice with the legalistic perversion of remedial processes?
The evidence conclusively shows that
a defendant charged with murder was
lying unconscious on the floor during
the whole time that the affray resulting
in the killing was going on, but on appeal a verdict against this defendant,
who is conceded to be innocent, is sustained solely because a rule of appellate practice requiring the point to be
first raised in the trial court was not observed.' 9 Could any one but a lawyer
so completely lose the sense of moral
values? Could any case more strikingly -prove the futility of mere logic as a
guide to legal practice?
Every case for a nonsuit or a directed
"7 Lowe v. Morris (1S53) 13 Ga. 147.
Is Choate v. Spencer- (1893) 13 Mont. 127, 32
Pac. 651, 20 L. R. A. 424, 40 Am. St. Rep. 425.
19 State v. Garcia (1914) 19 N. Mex. 414,
143 Pac. 1012. Fortunately this shocking opinion was reversed on a rehearing.

verdict involves the question of practical
expediency in the use of the institution
of the jury. The so-called "scintilla
rule" embodies the legal dogma of a jury
operating as an end in itself, under rules
of pure logic so delicately adjusted that
the weight of one hair is a perfectly adequate test of an issue of fact. What so
contrary to common sense as the characteristically legal proposition that, since
the credibility of witnesses is a ques-'
tion of fact, the jury must be given the
oppcrtunity of disbelieving uncontradieted and unimpeached oral testimony? 20 The legalistic mind makes the
jury a fetish; the ethical mind uses it
as a -practical means for doing substantial justice.
The whole doctrine of new trials and
of appeal and error involves a study in
ethical compromises. A trial can hardly
go on without technical error, which
creates a presumption in favor of recurrent new trials. But society cannot
afford to maintain a standard of procedural accuracy so high that the expense
is cut of proportion to the value of the
results. Where shall the line be drawn?
How much error will suffice to make a
new trial or a reversal on appeal advisable? The cases dealing with motions
for new trials are all applications of the
rule of social expediency to the infinitely
various departures from procedural
rules. Questions of appealable orders
raise problems of administrative policy,
and distinctions between harmless and
prejudicial error involve adjustments
between the letter and the spirit of remedial law. In all these cases the lawyers
and the courts are joint agencies working
in the public welfare, and what the
courts cannot rightly, grant lawyers cannot rightly urge. Every such case is a
concrete problem in public service.
V.
Such, then, are the three chief functicns of procedure as it ministers to the
cause of legal education. As the beneficiary of an absolute monopoly in the use
of procedural -processes, the bar is un20 Giles v. Giles (1910) 204 Mass. 383, 90 N.
E. 595.
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der a definite obligation to acquire adequate knowledge and develop reasonable
skill in employing them. The duty to
educate in this field lies with the schools.
It will not do to say that the technique
of practice can be picked up after the
student gets into his professional work.
The schools must relieve clients from
the burden of educating the bar.
Again, the lawyer is the only effective
agency for improving the methods of
legal administration, since he alone is initiated into its mysteries. No improvement can be expected from an uninformed bar, and information cannot be
obtained in the daily conventional routine of a lawyer's work. The schools
alone are able to give the knowledge and
the outlook, and to create the interest
necessary for adequate reform.
Finally, the outstanding failure of the
profession to meet the moral demands
of the public in their use of the machinery of the law is the result of a lack of

perspective rather than of a lack of character. Lawyers overemphasize logic and
minimize ethics as a test of professional
conduct. They need to acquire an intuitive sense of the ethical values inherent
in the choice and use of procedural
processes. Only in the schools can this.
be done, for there 'alone are combined
the leisure, the detached attitude, the enthusiasm, and the impressionability necessary for creating a permanent basis
for a consistent ethical outlook upon
professional service.
These functions vitally affect the legal
profession. They bear upon that side of
the law with which the public is most
dissatisfied-its administration. If they
have been correctly analyzed in this inquiry, the schools must not only revise
their views respecting the importance of
procedure, but by their methods of teaching they must make it contribute more
effectively to the development of the
legal profession as a true public service.

